// Code generated by smithy-go-codegen DO NOT EDIT.

package kms

import (
	"context"
	"fmt"
	awsmiddleware "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/middleware"
	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms/types"
	"github.com/aws/smithy-go/middleware"
	smithyhttp "github.com/aws/smithy-go/transport/http"
)

// Creates a [digital signature] for a message or message digest by using the private key in an
// asymmetric signing KMS key. To verify the signature, use the Verifyoperation, or use
// the public key in the same asymmetric KMS key outside of KMS. For information
// about asymmetric KMS keys, see [Asymmetric KMS keys]in the Key Management Service Developer Guide.
//
// Digital signatures are generated and verified by using asymmetric key pair,
// such as an RSA, ECC, or ML-DSA pair that is represented by an asymmetric KMS
// key. The key owner (or an authorized user) uses their private key to sign a
// message. Anyone with the public key can verify that the message was signed with
// that particular private key and that the message hasn't changed since it was
// signed.
//
// To use the Sign operation, provide the following information:
//
//   - Use the KeyId parameter to identify an asymmetric KMS key with a KeyUsage
//     value of SIGN_VERIFY . To get the KeyUsage value of a KMS key, use the DescribeKey
//     operation. The caller must have kms:Sign permission on the KMS key.
//
//   - Use the Message parameter to specify the message or message digest to sign.
//     You can submit messages of up to 4096 bytes. To sign a larger message, generate
//     a hash digest of the message, and then provide the hash digest in the Message
//     parameter. To indicate whether the message is a full message, a digest, or an
//     ML-DSA EXTERNAL_MU, use the MessageType parameter.
//
//   - Choose a signing algorithm that is compatible with the KMS key.
//
// When signing a message, be sure to record the KMS key and the signing
// algorithm. This information is required to verify the signature.
//
// Best practices recommend that you limit the time during which any signature is
// effective. This deters an attack where the actor uses a signed message to
// establish validity repeatedly or long after the message is superseded.
// Signatures do not include a timestamp, but you can include a timestamp in the
// signed message to help you detect when its time to refresh the signature.
//
// To verify the signature that this operation generates, use the Verify operation. Or
// use the GetPublicKeyoperation to download the public key and then use the public key to
// verify the signature outside of KMS.
//
// The KMS key that you use for this operation must be in a compatible key state.
// For details, see [Key states of KMS keys]in the Key Management Service Developer Guide.
//
// Cross-account use: Yes. To perform this operation with a KMS key in a different
// Amazon Web Services account, specify the key ARN or alias ARN in the value of
// the KeyId parameter.
//
// Required permissions: [kms:Sign] (key policy)
//
// Related operations: Verify
//
// Eventual consistency: The KMS API follows an eventual consistency model. For
// more information, see [KMS eventual consistency].
//
// [Key states of KMS keys]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/key-state.html
// [digital signature]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature
// [Asymmetric KMS keys]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/symmetric-asymmetric.html
// [kms:Sign]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/kms-api-permissions-reference.html
// [KMS eventual consistency]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/accessing-kms.html#programming-eventual-consistency
func (c *Client) Sign(ctx context.Context, params *SignInput, optFns ...func(*Options)) (*SignOutput, error) {
	if params == nil {
		params = &SignInput{}
	}

	result, metadata, err := c.invokeOperation(ctx, "Sign", params, optFns, c.addOperationSignMiddlewares)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	out := result.(*SignOutput)
	out.ResultMetadata = metadata
	return out, nil
}

type SignInput struct {

	// Identifies an asymmetric KMS key. KMS uses the private key in the asymmetric
	// KMS key to sign the message. The KeyUsage type of the KMS key must be
	// SIGN_VERIFY . To find the KeyUsage of a KMS key, use the DescribeKey operation.
	//
	// To specify a KMS key, use its key ID, key ARN, alias name, or alias ARN. When
	// using an alias name, prefix it with "alias/" . To specify a KMS key in a
	// different Amazon Web Services account, you must use the key ARN or alias ARN.
	//
	// For example:
	//
	//   - Key ID: 1234abcd-12ab-34cd-56ef-1234567890ab
	//
	//   - Key ARN:
	//   arn:aws:kms:us-east-2:111122223333:key/1234abcd-12ab-34cd-56ef-1234567890ab
	//
	//   - Alias name: alias/ExampleAlias
	//
	//   - Alias ARN: arn:aws:kms:us-east-2:111122223333:alias/ExampleAlias
	//
	// To get the key ID and key ARN for a KMS key, use ListKeys or DescribeKey. To get the alias name
	// and alias ARN, use ListAliases.
	//
	// This member is required.
	KeyId *string

	// Specifies the message or message digest to sign. Messages can be 0-4096 bytes.
	// To sign a larger message, provide a message digest.
	//
	// If you provide a message digest, use the DIGEST value of MessageType to prevent
	// the digest from being hashed again while signing.
	//
	// This member is required.
	Message []byte

	// Specifies the signing algorithm to use when signing the message.
	//
	// Choose an algorithm that is compatible with the type and size of the specified
	// asymmetric KMS key. When signing with RSA key pairs, RSASSA-PSS algorithms are
	// preferred. We include RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms for compatibility with
	// existing applications.
	//
	// This member is required.
	SigningAlgorithm types.SigningAlgorithmSpec

	// Checks if your request will succeed. DryRun is an optional parameter.
	//
	// To learn more about how to use this parameter, see [Testing your permissions] in the Key Management
	// Service Developer Guide.
	//
	// [Testing your permissions]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/testing-permissions.html
	DryRun *bool

	// A list of grant tokens.
	//
	// Use a grant token when your permission to call this operation comes from a new
	// grant that has not yet achieved eventual consistency. For more information, see [Grant token]
	// and [Using a grant token]in the Key Management Service Developer Guide.
	//
	// [Grant token]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/grants.html#grant_token
	// [Using a grant token]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/using-grant-token.html
	GrantTokens []string

	// Tells KMS whether the value of the Message parameter should be hashed as part
	// of the signing algorithm. Use RAW for unhashed messages; use DIGEST for message
	// digests, which are already hashed; use EXTERNAL_MU for 64-byte representative μ
	// used in ML-DSA signing as defined in NIST FIPS 204 Section 6.2.
	//
	// When the value of MessageType is RAW , KMS uses the standard signing algorithm,
	// which begins with a hash function. When the value is DIGEST , KMS skips the
	// hashing step in the signing algorithm. When the value is EXTERNAL_MU KMS skips
	// the concatenated hashing of the public key hash and the message done in the
	// ML-DSA signing algorithm.
	//
	// Use the DIGEST or EXTERNAL_MU value only when the value of the Message
	// parameter is a message digest. If you use the DIGEST value with an unhashed
	// message, the security of the signing operation can be compromised.
	//
	// When using ECC_NIST_EDWARDS25519 KMS keys:
	//
	//   - ED25519_SHA_512 signing algorithm requires KMS MessageType:RAW
	//
	//   - ED25519_PH_SHA_512 signing algorithm requires KMS MessageType:DIGEST
	//
	// When you specify the ED25519_PH_SHA_512 signing algorithm with
	// MessageType:DIGEST , KMS still performs the SHA-512 prehash described in [Step 1 of Section 7.8.1 in FIPS 186-5]. This
	// means the input is hashed twice: once by you and once by KMS.
	//
	// When the value of MessageType is DIGEST , the length of the Message value must
	// match the length of hashed messages for the specified signing algorithm.
	//
	// When the value of MessageType is EXTERNAL_MU the length of the Message value
	// must be 64 bytes.
	//
	// You can submit a message digest and omit the MessageType or specify RAW so the
	// digest is hashed again while signing. However, this can cause verification
	// failures when verifying with a system that assumes a single hash.
	//
	// The hashing algorithm that Sign uses is based on the SigningAlgorithm value.
	//
	//   - Signing algorithms that end in SHA_256 use the SHA_256 hashing algorithm.
	//
	//   - Signing algorithms that end in SHA_384 use the SHA_384 hashing algorithm.
	//
	//   - Signing algorithms that end in SHA_512 use the SHA_512 hashing algorithm.
	//
	//   - Signing algorithms that end in SHAKE_256 use the SHAKE_256 hashing
	//   algorithm.
	//
	//   - SM2DSA uses the SM3 hashing algorithm. For details, see [Offline verification with SM2 key pairs].
	//
	// [Step 1 of Section 7.8.1 in FIPS 186-5]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf#page=39
	// [Offline verification with SM2 key pairs]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/offline-operations.html#key-spec-sm-offline-verification
	MessageType types.MessageType

	noSmithyDocumentSerde
}

type SignOutput struct {

	// The Amazon Resource Name ([key ARN] ) of the asymmetric KMS key that was used to sign the
	// message.
	//
	// [key ARN]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/concepts.html#key-id-key-ARN
	KeyId *string

	// The cryptographic signature that was generated for the message.
	//
	//   - When used with the supported RSA signing algorithms, the encoding of this
	//   value is defined by [PKCS #1 in RFC 8017].
	//
	//   - When used with the ECDSA_SHA_256 , ECDSA_SHA_384 , or ECDSA_SHA_512 signing
	//   algorithms, this value is a DER-encoded object as defined by ANSI X9.62–2005 and
	//   [RFC 3279 Section 2.2.3]. This is the most commonly used signature format and is appropriate for most
	//   uses.
	//
	// When you use the HTTP API or the Amazon Web Services CLI, the value is
	// Base64-encoded. Otherwise, it is not Base64-encoded.
	//
	// [RFC 3279 Section 2.2.3]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.2.3
	// [PKCS #1 in RFC 8017]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017
	Signature []byte

	// The signing algorithm that was used to sign the message.
	SigningAlgorithm types.SigningAlgorithmSpec

	// Metadata pertaining to the operation's result.
	ResultMetadata middleware.Metadata

	noSmithyDocumentSerde
}

func (c *Client) addOperationSignMiddlewares(stack *middleware.Stack, options Options) (err error) {
	if err := stack.Serialize.Add(&setOperationInputMiddleware{}, middleware.After); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	err = stack.Serialize.Add(&awsAwsjson11_serializeOpSign{}, middleware.After)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	err = stack.Deserialize.Add(&awsAwsjson11_deserializeOpSign{}, middleware.After)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err := addProtocolFinalizerMiddlewares(stack, options, "Sign"); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("add protocol finalizers: %v", err)
	}

	if err = addlegacyEndpointContextSetter(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addSetLoggerMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addClientRequestID(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addComputeContentLength(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addResolveEndpointMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addComputePayloadSHA256(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addRetry(stack, options, c); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addRawResponseToMetadata(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addRecordResponseTiming(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addSpanRetryLoop(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addClientUserAgent(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = smithyhttp.AddErrorCloseResponseBodyMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = smithyhttp.AddCloseResponseBodyMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addSetLegacyContextSigningOptionsMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addUserAgentRetryMode(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addCredentialSource(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addOpSignValidationMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = stack.Initialize.Add(newServiceMetadataMiddleware_opSign(options.Region), middleware.Before); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addRecursionDetection(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addRequestIDRetrieverMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addResponseErrorMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addRequestResponseLogging(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addDisableHTTPSMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addInterceptBeforeRetryLoop(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addInterceptAttempt(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err = addInterceptors(stack, options); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return nil
}

func newServiceMetadataMiddleware_opSign(region string) *awsmiddleware.RegisterServiceMetadata {
	return &awsmiddleware.RegisterServiceMetadata{
		Region:        region,
		ServiceID:     ServiceID,
		OperationName: "Sign",
	}
}